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Introduction
In times gone by, authentication was not a complex task. Enter the computer era, where one cannot see the entity on the remote end of a computer network, and indeed the entity could be a friend or an attacker; authentication is quite a complex task. Authentication is the process of verifying that someone or something is who or what it claims to be. Authentication is usually based on one or more of the following factors:
What you know: It means someone mentally possesses something. It only verifies that someone knows something. It is characterized by secrecy. Example: a password or a PIN
What you have:
It is any form of issued or acquired self-identification token. It is characterized by physical possession. Example: a smart card or physical keys.
What you are/do: It is a biometric related characteristic unique to an individual. Example: fingerprint, iris or voiceprint.
A single password is an excellent authenticator. Its secrecy is a good defence against theft. Furthermore, it is convenient and inexpensive. But a memorable password can often be guessed or searched by an attacker; and a long, random, changing password is difficult to remember. A better authentication method is to require that the user provides a physical object as a "smart card" along with a password. If the smart card is lost or stolen, the user is likely to know about it and act accordingly. Moreover it is password protected and hence, cannot be activated without knowing the password. Smart cards are generally tamper resistant hence, are relatively difficult for a hacker to compromise. A card alone cannot be used as an authenticator because it is completely insecure if lost or stolen. Biometric authenticators offer several advantages over other authenticators. They cannot be lost or forgotten; they are difficult to forge or copy. However, if a biometric is compromised, it is not as easily replaceable as passwords or smart cards. Thus, none of these methods is entirely foolproof. But properly implemented in combination of one or more can provide secure remote user authentication. Use of a single factor, even if multiple pieces of evidence are offered, is considered to be weak authentication. A combination of two or (more) factors, such as a password and a smart card and/or biometric, is called two-factor (or multi-factor) authentication, is considered to be strong authentication.
With the large scale of proliferation of the Internet and network technologies, smart card-based authentication schemes have been widely deployed to verify the legitimacy of remote user's login request. In remote authentication process, a remote server authenticates a registered user based on his secret credentials. In traditional schemes, the server has to store a password table to save passwords of all the registered users. In 1981, Lamport proposed a remote user authentication scheme requiring a password verification table to be stored on the server's side [24] . Lamport claimed that his scheme is secure even if an adversary eavesdrops on the communication between a user and the server. Lamport's scheme has played an important role in the development of remote user authentication schemes. In 1990, Shimizu proposed the so called CINON protocol [36] , to solve the drawbacks of high hash overhead and password resetting of Lamport's scheme. Later, in 1998, Shimizu proposed their PERM (Privacy Enhanced Information Reading and Writing Management) protocol [37] to solve the random number memorizing problem of the CINON protocol. In 1995, Horng and later, in 1998, Jan et al., proposed solutions to prevent password tables from being stolen or modified by attackers, where the password table is no longer required to be kept by the server [12, 15] . In 1995, inspired by Lamport's method, Haller developed the famous S/KEY one-time password for the Internet draft RFC 1760 [11] . Later on, S/KEY authentication scheme was found to be flawed for replay, server impersonation and password guessing attacks [32, 43] . In 2000, Hwang and Li [14] identified that Lamport's scheme is susceptible to the risks of hacking and modifying the password table. Thus Hwang and Li proposed a remote user authentication scheme without using the password table, which was based on El Gamal public key encryption method [7] . Until now, there have been ample of remote user authentication schemes published in the literature and each published scheme has its own merits and demerits [2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16-18, 20-23, 25-27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44] . In 2000, Sun proposed an efficient password-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [38] . Sun's scheme requires only several hash operations instead of the costly modular exponentiation. However, Sun's scheme does not provide mutual authentications. In 2002, Chien et al. [4] proposed password-based remote user authentication scheme, and claimed that their scheme provides mutual authentication, free choice of passwords, no verification table, and involves only a few hashing operations. Later, Ku-Chen [22] showed that Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection attack [33] or an insider attack [22] and is not reparable [13] . Ku-Chen also gave an improved scheme [22] to prohibit the weaknesses of Chien et al.'s scheme. But Yoon et al. [44] showed that the improved scheme [22] is still susceptible to a parallel session attack and is insecure when changing the user's password in the password changing phase. Hence, Yoon et al. [44] presented an enhancement to resolve such problems. In 2007, Wang et al. [40] showed A good definition of the known-key attack was introduced in [34] . Given two entities A and B, if one of their previous session keys or one of their previous instances of plaintexts is known to U A , the future session keys and plaintexts cannot be compromised. It is a basic security requirement of a key agreement scheme. In
Step-6 of the verification phase, if a used session key C 1 * = h(r ⊕ b) is compromised by U A , then U A can easily employ it to derive the secret information P = h(ID ⊕ x) by calculating C 1 * ⊕ C 1 in Step-3 of the login phase. Note that U A can monitor all communicated messages between U and S. Then U A can select two random numbers r A and b A and calculate
Then U A sends a login request {ID, C 1A , C 2A , T A } to S. By performing the verification phase, U A can establish a new session key C 1 * = h(r A ï>≈ b A ) with S and achieve the purpose of the cheat.
Smart card loss attack
Suppose SC of U is stolen/found by U A and the stored secret values V, R, b, h(.) and h P (.) were extracted through the studies [19, 31] . With this information, U A can guess a password PW* and calculates h(b ⊕ PW*). Then U A can calculate P* = R ⊕ h(b ⊕ PW*) and V* = h P * (h(b ⊕ PW*)). If V* = V, it indicates that U A did guess the correct password and correct secret information, i.e. PW* = PW and P* = P. Thus, with smart card loss attack U A is able to mount:
• offline password guessing attack, or
• offline secret information P = (ID ⊕ x) guessing attack.
Tracing ID corresponding to the stolen/lost SC
Suppose an intelligent attacker U A has maintained the record of various login requests. And as explained in section 3.2., from U's stolen/lost SC, U A possess the correctly guessed password PW and secret information P = (ID ⊕ x). Now U A randomly picks a login request {ID, C 1 , C 2 , T U } from the record; computes C 1 * = C 1 ⊕ P and C 2 * = h P (C 1 * || T U ). If C 2 * = C 2 , it implies that the stolen/found SC and this login request belong to the same user. Otherwise U A repeats the same procedure with another login request from the record. In this way, if U A is successful then he now possesses ID, PW and P corresponding to U.
Denial of service attack
Once U A actually guesses the correct password PW* and successfully traces the corresponding ID of U as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively, he can change the password of U by applying the following steps:
1. U A inserts the stolen/found SC into the card reader, keys ID and PW of U, and requests to change password.
SC computes P* = R
) and checks whether V*? = V, obviously, both of them are the same, and this smart card will accept the password change request.
3. U A inputs a new password PW NEW . Then the SC computes:
4. SC replaces R, V with R NEW and V NEW respectively. Now the new password is successfully updated. Now U A replaces the SC of U. After that, the registered legal user U cannot make any valid login requests since his old password will not work anymore. Consequently U will have to face the denial of service.
User impersonation attack
As explained above, if U A is successful in obtaining ID, PW and P corresponding to U and possesses the SC of U, then obviously he can impersonate U and S to make fool of both to access the services provided by S. But even if U A replaces the stolen smart card of U, he can impersonate U to fool S as he knows ID, PW, b, P = h(ID ⊕ x), h(.) and h P (.); in the following manner:
1. U A selects a random number r A and computes C 1A = P ⊕ h(r A ⊕ b) and
2. Since ID is valid and TA is fresh, S will proceed to compute P = h(ID ⊕ x), C 1A * = P ⊕ C 1A , C 2A * = h P (C 1A *) || T A ). Since the computed result C 2A * equals the received C 2A , S will accept U A 's login request treating it to be U's login request.
Thus Chen et al.'s scheme does not resist the user impersonation attack.
Server impersonation attack
In case U A replaces the stolen SC of U, we continue the above discussion for server impersonation to fool U in the following manner:
1. When U sends the login request {ID, C 1 , C 2 , T U } to S, U A intercepts it and computes C 1A * = P ⊕ C 1A , C 3A = h P (C 1A * ⊕ T A || P) and sends {T A , C 3A } to U.
2. Since TA is fresh, so U will proceed to compute
Since the computed result C 3A * equals the received C 3A , so U will be fooled to believe the message to come from legitimate S.
Thus Chen et al.'s scheme does not resist the server impersonation attack.
Lack of perfect forward secrecy/unsecure session key establishment
Suppose that U's long term secret P = h(ID ⊕ x) has been compromised by U A in some situations. As previously described, U A can impersonate U to login S or impersonate S to fool U. We have also demonstrated that U A can search the identity corresponding to a stolen/lost SC. With this identity the login request ID, C 1 , C 2 , T U (travelling over an insecure network) of the corresponding user can be identified by U A . Further, U A can obtain the session key by computing h(r ⊕ b) = C 1 ⊕ P. As h(r ⊕ b) is used as the session key for securing the communications between U and S, U A can decrypt/manipulate all the messages of the session. Thus Chen et al.'s scheme fails to provide perfect forward secrecy [6] . In other words we can say that Chen et al.'s scheme fails to establish a secure session key.
Man-in-the-middle attack
It is apparent from the above discussion that under above assumed situation, U A can impersonate U, can spoof S and can access the secret session key. Therefore U A can perform a man-in-the-middle attack by establishing a parallel session between U and S. Consequently Chen et al.'s scheme fails to provide the claimed mutual authentication.
Attack on server's secret key
Once the secret information P = h(ID ⊕ x) is revealed, then S's secret key x may also be broken. Once it is accomplished then U A has full control over the scheme. Two different ways to attack the scheme in this scenario are as shown below:
3.9.1. U A intercepts an arbitrary login request ID*, C 1 , C 2 , T U , then he can easily impersonate U* and S U A selects two random numbers r A and b A ; computes
. U A sends login request ID*, C 1A , C 2A , T A to S, which obviously will pass the authentication test. Further S computes C3A
) and sends TS, C3A. U A checks the validity of S by verifying the equivalence C3A* = C3A and uses h(r A ⊕ b A ) as the session key.
U A can exhaust the protected resources of S by successfully login into S as an undetectable unregistered user
From an intercepted login request ID, C 1 , C 2 , T U , U A first analyses the format of ID. Then U A creates a fake identity IDA of same bits and similar format as that of ID and then proceeds in similar way as discussed in the former case. Since S does not maintain any record of its registered users so it will not be able to differentiate between a registered user and an unregistered user if a login request passes the ID format and timestamp freshness test.
Poor reparability
Unfortunately the attacks described by Sections 3.5., 3.6., 3.7. and 3.8., cannot be restricted and stopped even if U has detected that P = h(ID ⊕ x) has been compromised and then used a new password to re-register with S. As the value of P is determined only by U's identity ID and S's permanent secret key x, S cannot change P for U unless ID or x can be changed. However, since x is commonly used for all users rather than specifically used only for U, it is unreasonable and inefficient if x should be changed to recover the security of U only. Additionally, it is also impractical to change ID, which should be tied to U in most application systems. Thus Chen et al.'s scheme is not easily reparable.
No provision for revocation of lost smart card
It is one of the requirements of smart card-based authentication schemes that in case of the loss of cards, there should be provision in the system for invalidating the further use of a lost smart card, otherwise U A can impersonate valid registered user [8] . Through keeping record of valid card identifiers of each registered user, the authentication system can distinguish the valid card from the invalid one. 
Drawback
During
Step-1 in the registration phase, U has to select a random number b, and remember or record it until it receives his SC from S, so that he can enter b into his SC in Step-5. Since b is a random number, it is not easy for U to remember it. Alternatively, if U records it by writing it down on a slip of paper, he has to protect that slip of paper. Therefore the process of registration in Chen et al.'s scheme is inconvenient for U.
The proposed protocol
In this section, we propose an enhancement to Chen et al.'s scheme that can withstand the security flaws described in the previous section. S maintains an ADB which is signed by S's secret key x. In addition, S will routinely and frequently make offsite backup of ADB. And we assume that the offsite backup is well protected. If any unauthorized modification of ADB occurs, S will detect it and then restore ADB by using the offsite backup. Our presented scheme consists of five different phases. Namely: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, password change phase, and revocation of lost or stolen smart card phase. We illustrate the detailed processes in sequence along with Fig.1 depicting the entire protocol structure of the proposed scheme. These phases work as follows:
Registration phase
This phase is invoked whenever U initially registers or re-registers to S. The following steps are involved in this phase.
U ⇒ S: ID.
2. S checks if ID is already in ADB or not. If ID already exists in ADB, S intimates U to choose another ID. In addition S checks the registration record of U and if U is a new user then S sets value of N = 0, otherwise if U is re-registering in the system then S sets N = 1 and stores (ID, N) in its ADB.
3. S combines ID with IDS in a secret way (known only to S) to produce CIUS. Then S computes CS depending on certain fixed number of bits of x, ID and IDS. Selection of bits is not random but specific pertaining to the position of bits. S computes P = h(x || CIUS || N) and a small digest h(CS) of CS.
S ⇒ U: SC = P, h(.) and h(CS).
5. U generates FP, freely selects PW and a secret key K.
6. U activates the SC. U inserts the SC into the smart card reader and inputs ID, FP, K & PW.
SC computes R = P ⊕ h(FP || PW), W = P ⊕ K and V = h K (P || ID || FP || PW).
The SC replaces P with R, W and V. Finally, SC = R, W, V, h(.).
Login phase
Whenever U wants to login to S, the following operations will be performed:
1. U inserts his SC into the smart card reader, generates FP and then enters ID, FP, PW and h(CS).
SC extracts P = R ⊕ h(FP || PW), K = W ⊕ P and checks whether h K (P || ID || FP || PW)? = V holds or not.
If not, SC terminates this session; otherwise 3. SC generates a nonce n; computes C 1 = P ⊕ n, M = K ⊕ h(P || n) and C 2 = h K (h(CS) || n || T U ).
U → S: {ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U }.
Note: SC halts and displays a need for re-registration if U fails to enter ID, FP, PW and h(CS) correctly over certain number of times.
Verification phase
After the login request is received by S, the following steps are performed by S and U:
1. If ID format is incorrect, ID is not on ADB or (T S -T U ) ≥ δ t then S drops the login request; otherwise.
S extracts N from ADB and computes CIUS, P = h((x || CIUS || N) and h(CS).
3. S extracts n = C 1 ⊕ P, K = M ⊕ h(P || n) and computes C 2 * = h K (h(CS) || n || T U ).
4. S checks if C 2 *? = C 2 . This equivalence authenticates the legality of U and the login request is accepted else the connection is interrupted.
U and S agree on common session key K SESS
. Afterwards all the subsequent messages between U and S are XoR-ed with session key K SESS .
Password change phase
This procedure is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one. In this phase we emphasize that U's smart card must have the ability to detect login failure times. Once the number of login failures exceeds a predefined system value, SC must be locked immediately to prevent the exhaustive password guessing behavior. Suppose U want to select a new password PW NEW and/or a new fingerprint FP NEW to replace original password and/or original fingerprint FP. Then U and SC perform the following steps.
1. First SC authenticates U in a similar way as in the login phase up to Step-2. If U is authenticated successfully, then SC asks U to enter PW NEW and/or FP NEW .
SC computes R
3. SC replaces R, V with R NEW and V NEW respectively.
Note: If U wishes, then he can also update the value of K through this phase.
User Server
Registration Phase: 
Selects ID {ID} Computes CIUS, CS and h(CS)
PAborts if V * ≠ V n ← C 1 ⊕ P, K ← M ⊕ h(P || n) C 1 = P ⊕ n, M = K h(P || n) C 2 * = h K (h(CS) || n || T U ) C 2 = h K (h(CS) || n || T U ) {ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U } K SESS = h[(n || T U )•(P)•(K || h(CS))] K SESS = h[(n || T U )•(P)•(K || h(CS))]
User Smart Card
Password Change Phase: 
Revocation phase
In case of lost/stolen SC, U, requests S for its revocation for which S increases N by one in the ADB. Later on U can re-register to S without changing his ID. At this stage U may also use a new password and a new fingerprint.
Security and usability analysis of the proposed scheme

Security analysis
A smart card is a memory card that uses an embedded micro-processor from a smart card reader machine to perform required operations specified in the protocol. Kocher et al. [19] and Messerges et al. [31] pointed out that all existing smart cards cannot prevent the information stored in them from being extracted by techniques such as by monitoring their power consumption. Some other reverse engineering techniques are also available for extracting information from smart cards. It means that once a smart card is stolen by U A , he can extract the information stored in it. A good password authentication scheme should provide protection from different feasible attacks.
Offline password guessing attack
In case SC of U is stolen/found by U A , he can extract all the information R, W, V, h(.) stored inside its memory. From R = P ⊕ h(FP || PW), U's password cannot be guessed without knowing the secret information P and without being able to generate FP. Secondly, this attack cannot be mounted using V = h K (P || ID || FP || PW) unless U A knows about K, and P. In fact it is not possible to guess two values simultaneously in real time polynomial and no one except U can generate FP. Moreover, in our scheme U's login request message ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U is well protected and un-involved with U's password. This design eliminates the correlation between U's password and the transmitted message. Thus U A has no ability to examine his guessed password with previous legitimate requests or reply message in an offline mode. Hence our scheme is secure against the offline password guessing attack.
Offline secret information guessing attack
U A cannot guess the secret information P from the stolen/found SC. To guess P from R = P ⊕ h(FP || PW), he must know PW and must be able to generate FP. To guess P from W = P ⊕ K, he must know K. To guess P from V = h K (P || ID || FP || PW), he must know PW, K and must be able to generate FP. Suppose U A arbitrarily guesses a value P* and computes K* = W ⊕ P*, but he cannot verify his guess using V = h K (P || ID || FP || PW) without knowing FP and PW. Note that, it is not feasible for U A to generate FP. Further, suppose U A intercepts the transmitted login request ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U . Then U A arbitrarily guesses a value P*, computes n* = C 1 ⊕ P*, K* = M ⊕ h(P* || n*), but he cannot verify his guess using C 2 = h K (h(CS) || n || T U ) because C 2 does not contain the value P.
Tracing ID corresponding to the stolen/lost SC
As we have seen that offline password guessing attack and offline secret information guessing attack are not possible in our scheme, so identity corresponding to the stolen/lost SC cannot be traced using previously intercepted login requests.
Insider attack
In our scheme, U sends only his ID as the registration request. This design rules out the possibility of insider attack.
Clock un-synchronization problem and replay attack
As mentioned by Gong [9] , the timestamp based authentication scheme may suffer from the replay attack as the transmission delay is unpredictable in a network environment. For this reason, we have also utilized a nonce based design along with timestamp based design. Accordingly, our proposed scheme can prevent serious clock un-synchronization problem. Furthermore, in the login-verification phase, U A may intercept U's previous login request, and send it to S as a new login request. However, in our scheme the values M, C 1 , or C 2 are not allowed to be used from session to session. U A cannot pass the verification process at the server's side with a previously eavesdropped login request. Obviously, the replay attack fails.
User impersonation attack
If U A intends to impersonate U, he has to make a legal login message. Although U A can intercept U's previous login request ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U , but he cannot derive/guess the correct value of P and K from it as we have seen earlier in Section 5.1.2. Moreover, he has no knowledge of CS/h(CS). Therefore, the resistance to the user impersonation attack can be guaranteed in our protocol.
Server impersonation attack
In the server impersonation attack, U A can manipulate the sensitive data of legitimate users via setting up fake servers.
In the proposed protocol, the malicious server cannot compute
] because the malicious server does not know the values of n, P, K and h(CS). Moreover, the session key is different for the same user in different login sessions. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against the server impersonation attack.
Man-in-the-middle attack/parallel session attack
We have seen earlier that U A cannot masquerade as U either by replaying a valid intercepted login request {ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U }, or by forging a valid login request because of the following reasons.
• C 2 consists of the fresh timestamp T U .
• Nonce (n) based design of login request.
• U A has no way to correctly know n, P, K, CS/h(CS) and PW of U.
• No one other than U can generate the fingerprint FP of U.
Additionally, U A cannot compute the agreed
] between U and S because U A does not know any of the values included in SESS . Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against the man-in-the-middle attack/parallel session attack.
Malicious user attack
During the registration phase, S provides SC = {P = h(x || CIUS || N), h(.)} and h(CS) to a user. A malicious privileged user having his own SC can extract the value P; but he cannot use it to create a valid login request to impersonate another valid user. Further, using his own identity, he cannot guess the secret key x of S from P. The reasons for these are as follows:
• The values CIUS, CS and P vary from one user to the other.
• The values of P and CS depend on SID and x which are known only to S.
• The method/operations employed in computing CIUS and CS is known only to S.
Therefore the proposed protocol is secure against the malicious user attack.
The known-key attack
Unlike Chen et al.'s scheme, our scheme does not employ the session key in computing the login request. If a used old session key is compromised by U A , it is not useful for him to derive any secret information from an intercepted login request {ID, M, C 1 , C 2 , T U }. Therefore, our scheme efficiently resists the known-key attack.
Denial of service attack
In this type of attack, an attacker updates password verification information on SC to some arbitrary value and hence a legal user cannot login successfully in a subsequent login request to the server. In our proposed protocol, U's smart card has the ability to detect login failure times. Once the number of login failures exceeds a predefined system value, SC must be locked immediately to prevent the exhaustive password guessing behavior. Besides SC checks the validity of ID, PW and FP before the password update procedure. In fact the fingerprint FP of U can be generated by no one other than U. On the server's side there is an ADB in our proposed protocol which stores (ID, N) corresponding to each user. So S is able to differentiate between its registered user and an un-registered user. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against the denial of service attack.
Leak of verifier attack/modification of ADB attack
In our scheme, S stores (ID, N) in its ADB. Identity is used in the plaintext form in a login request and N (an integral value which denotes the number of times U re-registers) is involved in P = h(x || CIUS || N). Even after knowing the values (ID, N), U A cannot compute P without knowing x and IDS. Thus the values stored in ADB do not facilitate in any important guess or computation. If U A performs any tampering with the ADB of S, it is detectable because ADB is signed by the private key of S and is regularly verified by S. In addition, S routinely and frequently makes offsite backups of the ADB. If S detects any unauthorized modification within ADB then S can restore ADB using the offsite backup, which is assumed to be well protected. Thus the proposed protocol is secure against the leak of verifier attack/modification of ADB attack.
Server's secret key(x) guessing attack
To guess the secret key x of S, U A must first know the correct value of P, but there is no way in which U A can obtain P. Only a malicious privileged user can extract P from his own SC. As discussed in Section 5.1.9., even after knowing P, it is not possible for a malicious privileged user to guess the secret key x of S. The malicious user knows his identity ID, but cannot guess x from P, because it is not possible to guess the two values x and IDS correctly at the same time in real time polynomial.
Usability analysis
Mutual authentication and session key establishment
S checks the validity of U by checking if C 2 * = C 2 (= h K (h(CS) || n || T U )). This equivalence confirms the validity of U. After this, both U and S establish and agree upon a session key
Authentication of S to U is not a problem after the successful establishment of secret K SESS , because then U and S can secretly communicate with each other at their own will, for instance S may authenticate itself to U by sending h(K SESS ⊕ (n || K)). Thus our proposed protocol provides session key establishment in a very simple way and which is also useful in accomplishing the mutual authentication.
Perfect forward secrecy
Suppose the long term secret key x of S is compromised by some means, U A cannot compute P = h(x || CIUS || N) without knowing IDS and N corresponding to U. Further the mode of computing CIUS is known to S only. Moreover U A still cannot recover the old session key KSESS = h[(n || T U ) · (P) · (K || h(CS))] unless he knows correct values of n, P, K and h(CS). Unlike Chen et al.'s scheme [3] , our scheme does not uses K SESS = h[(n || T U ) · (P) · (K || h(CS))] in login request. Further, it is apparent from the security analysis that U A /malicious user is not able to extract/guess the correct values n, P, K and h(CS). Thus it is computationally infeasible to obtain K SESS . Therefore, our improved scheme provides perfect forward secrecy [6] .
Quick wrong password detection mechanism within smart card/efficient password authentication
In the proposed protocol, the ownership check procedure runs whenever SC is inserted in to the card reader. SC drops or rejects the request if the user fails to insert the four correct values ID, FP, PW and h(CS) simultaneously.
Secure password change phase
U can freely choose and change password at his will without the help of S. The phase could also avoid easy modification of the password of U by any unauthorized user if he obtains the SC of U by some means. No one having SC can update the password without the exact values of ID, FP, PW and h(CS) corresponding to the SC. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the cryptanalysis of Chen et al.'s remote user authentication scheme. We have shown that Chen et al.'s scheme suffers from the known-key attack, smart card loss attacks, poor reparability, no revocation of lost smart card, unsecure session key establishment, absence of perfect forward secrecy and malicious user attack. In addition, we have shown the serious consequences of smart card loss attack on Chen et al.'s scheme like the user impersonation attack, attack on server's secret key, man-in-the-middle attack/parallel session attack and denial of service attack. To overcome the identified problems, we have developed an improved a smart card based remote user authentication scheme. Our proposed remedy eradicates all the identified weaknesses of Chen et al.'s scheme and is more secure and robust for real life use.
